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ENDING CORPORATE ANONYMITY: 
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP, SANCTIONS 
EVASION, AND WHAT THE UNITED NATIONS 
SHOULD DO ABOUT IT
Vineet Chandra*
I.  INTRODUCTION
In October of 2013, Texas-based plumber Mark Oberholtzer traded in 
his 2005 Ford F-250 pickup truck for a newer model at the Ford dealership 
down the road. It had served him well as a workhorse for his business, 
Mark-1 Plumbing. As he would later find out, the Ford dealership sold his 
old pickup at auction a month later and it was subsequently exported to 
Turkey. A little over a year thereafter, a group affiliated with the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) posted a photo to Twitter from Syria show-
ing a large truck-mounted gun in action. Emblazoned on the side of the 
truck was a simple graphic that read Mark-1 Plumbing and listed Mr. Ober-
holtzer’s phone number. ISIS had his truck.1
Five years after Mr. Oberholtzer’s saga began, North Korean dictator 
Kim Jong-Un met with United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in 
October of 2018.
2
The meeting itself was historic, so the fact that Mr. Kim 
arrived in a Rolls Royce Phantom received relatively little attention.
3
The 
same month, two armored Mercedes limousines, each worth in excess of 
$500,000 U.S. dollars, were delivered to Mr. Kim’s regime.
4
The vehicles 
appeared on state-run television shortly thereafter.
5
* Third-year law student at the University of Michigan Law School and Articles Edi-
tor for Volume 42 of the Michigan Journal of International Law (MJIL). I am grateful to Pro-
fessor Kristina Daugirdas for helping me conceptualize this paper in October 2019. My thanks 
as well to the MJIL Notes team. All errors are my own.
1. Jared Morgan, How a Texas Plumber’s Truck Wound Up in ISIS’ Hands, PUB.
RADIO INT’L (December 15, 2015, 3:15 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-12-15/how-
texas-plumbers-truck-wound-isis-hands.
2. LUCAS KUO & JASON ARTERBURN, C4ADS, LUX & LOADED: EXPOSING NORTH 
KOREA’S STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT NETWORKS 6 (2019).
3. Simon Denyer, Pompeo, Kim Jong Un agree to hold 2nd summit with Trump as soon 
as possible, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pompeo-
meets-kim-jong-un-in-north-korea-for-talks-on-denuclearization/2018/10/07/d9832280-c997-
11e8-9c0f-2ffaf6d422aa_story.html; Joshua Berlinger, Kim Jong Un Appears to Have a New 
Rolls-Royce, CNN (October 9, 2018, 4:45 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/09/asia/kim-
jong-un-rolls-royce-intl/index.html.
4. KUO & ARTERBRUN, supra note 2, at 3, 36.
5. Tyler Rogoway and Joseph Trevithick, What Sanctions? Kim Jong Un Gets Anoth-
er New Limo, This Time An S600 Mercedes-Maybach, DRIVE, (Feb. 9, 2019), 
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Both vehicle shipments—Mr. Oberholtzer’s truck and the Mercedes 
limousines—were in flagrant violation of United Nations (“U.N.”) sanctions 
on ISIS and the North Korean state, respectively. There is little reason to 
think these shipments were isolated incidents; indeed, there is ample evi-
dence to suggest that state actors and individuals around the world who are 
the targets of sanctions regimes—U.N. implemented or otherwise—have 
devised sophisticated tools and networks to evade those sanctions with little 
to no consequence. One of these tools is beneficial ownership.
In a joint March 2019 report, the Inter-American Development Bank 
(“IDB”) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) described beneficial ownership as follows:
Beneficial owners are . . . natural persons who ultimately own or 
control a legal entity or arrangement, such as a company, a trust, a 
foundation, etc. . . . When an individual is the sole shareholder of a 
company and controls it directly, that individual is the [beneficial 
owner] of the company. However, there may be more layers in-
volved in the ownership structure, perhaps a chain of entities be-
tween a legal vehicle and its [beneficial owner].
6
The report goes on to illustrate with a simple example; imagine an individu-
al owns 100 percent of a limited liability company (“LLC”), which in turn 
owns 100 percent of a joint stock company. In this scenario, while the joint 
stock company’s legal owner of record is the LLC, its beneficial owner is 
the individual. 
7
This is because the LLC, while enjoying the benefits of le-
gal personhood, is not a natural person. Beneficial ownership is a side effect
of this common practice, in modern legal systems, of affording legal per-
sonality to corporate entities.
8
Why is this distinction important? The IDB-
OECD report explains:
Anonymity enables many illegal activities to take place hidden 
from law enforcement authorities, such as tax evasion, corruption, 
money laundering, and financing of terrorism . . . . Imagine an in-
dividual, John Smith, who wants to evade taxation in his country A. 
If Smith owns several properties in country A, and holds bank ac-
counts and investments there, all in his own name, it would be very 
easy for country A’s authorities to detect that Smith is not paying 
taxes. The authorities would be aware of all his assets (for example, 
through systematic crosschecks with the agency responsible for the 
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26423/what-sanctions-kim-jong-un-gets-another-
new-limo-this-time-an-s600-mercedes-maybach.
6. Secretariat Glob. F. on Transparency & Exch. Info. for Tax Purposes & Inter-Am. 
Dev. Bank, A Beneficial Ownership Implementation Toolkit, at 3 (March 2019) [hereinafter 
IDB-OECD Toolkit].
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id. at 8.
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registration of real estate), that they have not been declared, and 
that the related taxes on wealth and income have not been paid. But 
if Smith wants to obscure his income or property ownership, he can 
easily create corporate structures across various jurisdictions to 
make it much more difficult to identify his ownership. The longer 
the chain of entities between a legal vehicle (in our example, Com-
pany A and its [beneficial owner], John Smith), and the more juris-
dictions the entities span, the harder it is to identify the [beneficial 
owner], given the need to determine who controls each of the lay-
ers.
9
In the vast majority of jurisdictions around the world, there is a generous 
array of corporate forms available to persons and companies looking to do 
business.
10
These entities come with varying degrees of regulation regarding 
how much information about the businesses’ principal owners must be dis-
closed at the time of registration and how much of that information is sub-
sequently available to the public.
11
There is little policy harmonization 
around the world on this matter.
12
Dictators and despots have long taken advantage of this unintended 
identity shield to evade sanctions which target them.
13
A few years after Mr. 
Oberholtzer’s truck appeared in Syria, the International Consortium of In-
vestigative Journalists broke the largest story on international money laun-
dering and corruption in history.
14
More than 11.5 million documents leaked 
to the group showed widespread money laundering and tax evasion by pub-
lic officials all over the world, enabled and obfuscated by a complex net-
work of more than 214,000 corporate entities in 200 countries.
15
The papers 
centered on a little known law firm called Mossack Fonseca and would 
come to be known as the Panama Papers.
16
As the investigation revealed, all 
sorts of actors—from terrorist financing cartels to the rich and powerful 
seeking to hide their wealth from tax authorities—make use of beneficial 
9. Id. at 4–5.
10. EMILE VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS , EMILY M. HALTER, ROBERT A. HARRISON,
JI WON PARK & J.C. SHERMAN, THE PUPPET MASTERS: HOW THE CORRUPT USE LEGAL 
STRUCTURES TO HIDE STOLEN ASSETS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 219 (2011).
11. Id. at 33–69.
12. Id. at 155.
13. Id. at 171–212.
14. The Panama Papers: Exposing the Rogue Offshore Finance Industry, INT’L 
CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (ICIJ), https://www.icij.org/investigations
/panama-papers (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).
15. Id.
16. Explore the Panama Papers Key Figures, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE 
JOURNALISTS (ICIJ) (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers
/explore-panama-papers-key-figures/.
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ownership to avoid the scrutiny of the world’s regulators and investigators.
17
As a part of the increasing focus on anti-money laundering (“AML”) efforts 
in the last two decades, regulators are waking up to this reality.
18
The com-
mon international question of the day, then, is what can be done about it.
This problem has been discussed widely in international organizations 
over the last decade. In 2011, the World Bank and the United Nations Of-
fice on Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”), through their Stolen Asset Recovery 
Initiative (“StAR”), jointly authored what can be  considered to be the foun-
dational baseline in the international discussion surrounding beneficial own-
ership regulation.
19
In 2014, the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”), or-
ganized under the OECD, released a comprehensive report on beneficial 
ownership and modified two of its principal recommendations to reflect its 
findings.
20
In 2017, the European Commission tackled this issue as a part of 
its Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (“4AMLD”); a Fifth 
(“5AMLD”) edition came into effect in July 2018, and a Sixth (“6AMLD”)
edition will launch in December of 2020.
21
But what more can be done? Aside from its participation in the 2011 
StAR publication through UNODC, the U.N. has mostly taken a back seat 
to national governments’ initiatives and other international organizations’
efforts to tackle this troubling issue. This paper argues that the U.N. should 
pursue three narrow and specific methods of approaching this issue. First, 
UNODC should create model legislation reflecting the modern consensus 
on how to regulate beneficial ownership and reiterate its support of the 
FATF recommendations on the subject. Second, the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) should strengthen its 
Legislative Guide on Key Principles of Business Registry to reflect the 
stronger, modern consensus. Third, the United Nations Security Council 
(“U.N.S.C.”) could exercise its legislative powers to require member states, 
as a matter of international peace and security under Chapter VII, to bring 
their beneficial ownership disclosure and registry policies into compliance 
with this modern consensus, though they are unlikely to do so for institu-
tional reasons.
17. See The Panama Papers: Exposing the Rogue Offshore Finance Industry, supra 
note 14.
18. See IDB-OECD Toolkit, supra note 6, at 4–7.
19. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 10, at 12.
20. See Fin. Action Task Force [“FATF”], Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial 
Ownership (2014) [hereinafter FATF, Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership]
; see also Fin. Action Task Force [“FATF”], The FATF Recommendations: International 
Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation
91–97 (October 2020) [hereinafter FATF, The FATF Recommendations].
21. See generally Matt Taylor, The Five Main Impacts of 5AMLD Regulation for Fi-
nancial Institutions, CONSULTANCY.UK (June 27, 2017), https://www.consultancy.uk/news
/13624/the-five-main-impacts-of-5amld-regulation-for-financial-institutions; PETER BURRELL 
& MICHAEL THORNE, THE FIFTH EU MONEY LAUNDERING DIRECTIVE: WHAT DOES THIS 
MEAN FOR THE “RISK BASED APPROACH” TO DUE DILIGENCE? 1–2 (2019).
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Beneficial ownership is a cornerstone in the global underworld’s efforts 
to hide money. Tackling it appropriately is an important endeavor—one 
well suited to the powers and capabilities of the U.N.
II. THE MODERN REGULATORY CONSENSUS ON 
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
The focus on AML policy at the international level began in earnest in 
the 1990s. In 1990, FATF released its first set of recommendations in the 
realm of money laundering.
22
In 1997, UNODC formally established the 
Global Programme against Money Laundering (“GPML”) pursuant to the 
authority granted to it under the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. The follow-
ing year, UNODC expanded the focus of GPML beyond just the drug trade 
and applied it to all serious crime.
23
In parallel, the U.N.S.C. passed Resolu-
tion 1267, setting up the first iteration of targeted sanctions in the regime 
that continues to be imposed to this day by the ISIL (Da’esh) & Al-Qaida 
Sanctions Committee.
24
In 2001, in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the Unit-
ed States, FATF expanded its focus to terrorism financing.
25
FATF pub-
lished nine additional recommendations specifically targeting the issue and 
completed its first comprehensive revision of its initial recommendations by 
2003 (together with the original recommendations, occasionally referred to 
as the FATF 40+9).
26
In 2011, UNODC and the World Bank jointly published The Puppet 
Masters: How the Corrupt Use Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets and 
What to Do About It, an authoritative 288-page report on the use of corpo-
rate entities and beneficial ownership for illicit purposes around the world.
27
That text has provided the foundation for AML regulation since then. Build-
ing on that work, FATF published a detailed report on the mechanics of its 
two recommendations that pertain to beneficial ownership regulation—
22. History of FATF, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [“FATF”], https://www.fatf-gafi.org
/about/historyofthefatf (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).
23. GPML Mandate, UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME (UNODC), 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/money-laundering/GPML-Mandate.pdf (last visited Dec. 
19, 2019).
24. S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolu-
tions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) Concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Le-
vant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities,
UNITED NATIONS SEC. COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267 (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2019). For the purposes of this paper, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(“ISIL”) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) are referenced as the same entity.
25. See FATF, The FATF Recommendations, supra note 20, at 7.
26. Id.
27. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS et al., supra note 10.
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Recommendations 24 and 25—in 2014.
28
Later that year, G20 leaders 
agreed to implement high-level principles heavily derived from the FATF 
report.
29
The 2014 FATF review represents the best solutions policymakers have 
to offer on this subject at the moment. In it, FATF lists several steps regula-
tors ought to take to minimize the ability of beneficial owners to hide be-
hind a web of legal persons. First, FATF says regulators need a comprehen-
sive list of all types of legal personalities distinct from natural persons that 
are available in their jurisdiction, and the processes for creating them.
30
Sec-
ond, jurisdictional authorities should create a registry of these legal person-
alities and require such entities to record and maintain basic information 
about themselves, including shareholder information.
31
Third, FATF posits 
that regulators need some mechanism by which to determine beneficial 
ownership of the authorized structures.
32
FATF suggests that the most trans-
parent way to do this is to create a centralized register of all corporate struc-
tures, hold beneficial ownership information about all of them, and require 
periodic updates of that information as part of the renewal processes for 
such vehicles.
33
Alternatively, having the structures collect and maintain that 
information themselves or separately collecting this information from tax 
authorities, stock exchanges, or other sources may also be possible. FATF 
encourages combining these approaches as necessary.
34
FATF also highlights a few finer points that make the structure of this 
policy more effective. First, and perhaps most obviously, companies should 
be required by law to cooperate with authorities by designating either a nat-
ural person or a financial institution to act on their behalf in disclosing com-
pany information to investigative bodies.
35
Second, FATF recommends ex-
tremely strong prohibitions and regulations of bearer shares and nominee 
shareholders or directors, respectively.
36
Bearer shares are shares in a corpo-
rate vehicle that entitle the holder of the documents at any given time to the 
full entitlements and protections of ordinary shareholders; use of bearer 
shares is therefore a common tactic to conceal the identity of the bearing 
shareholder, because bearer share companies rarely keep records of their 
28. FATF, Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership, supra note 20, at 10.
29. G20, G20 High-Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency (2014), 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/g20_high-
level_principles_beneficial_ownership_transparency.pdf.
30. FATF, Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership, supra note 20, at 12.
31. Id. at 13.
32. Id. at 19–27. 44.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 19.
35. Id. at 44.
36. Id.
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shareholders’ identities.
37
Similarly, nominee shareholders and directors are 
shareholders and directors, respectively, that have been nominated to appear 
on official documentation on behalf of the actual shareholder or director. 
FATF recommends an outright ban on bearer shares and suggests requiring 
nominee shareholders to disclose the identity of the natural person who 
nominated them.
38
Lastly, FATF recommends recording the information of 
the natural person that is effectively the control person of the entity, regard-
less of organizational structure.
39
FATF extends this same framework to the 
regulation of other, more jurisdictionally specific structures, such as trusts, 
Limited Liability Companies, foundations, and other entities.
40
It is interesting to note what FATF does not say. First, FATF generally 
phrases its recommendations as pertaining to country-level regulation.
41
In-
deed, in most countries, companies are regulated at the national level.
42
In 
several noteworthy jurisdictions, however, this regulation happens at a more 
local level. In the United States, for example, corporate charters are granted 
at the state level.
43
FATF’s regulatory suggestions are mostly portable to 
this more local level of regulatory control. A few of its recommendations, 
though, are predicated on a more universal level power and access to infor-
mation that might require company regulators to cooperate closely with fed-
eral authorities. This raises issues in jurisdictions like the United States 
where company registers are primarily housed at a lower level of govern-
ance.
44
Second, FATF’s recommendations make no mention of transactional 
due diligence measures. The Task Force’s report does not go into the details 
of what appropriate due diligence looks like when doing business with 
companies of unknown origin, presumably because this realm of business 
policy is already well regulated worldwide. The European Union (“EU”), 
the U.N., and the United States each require corporations doing business in-
ternationally to take varying degrees of precautions to avoid doing business 
with corporations of dubious ownership.
45
These regulations, like the For-
37. MAIRA MARTINI & MAGGIE MURPHY, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, G20
LEADERS OR LAGGARDS? REVIEWING G20 PROMISES ON ENDING ANONYMOUS COMPANIES 
52 (2018)
38. Id. at 17.
39. Id. at 8–9, 14–16.
40. Id. at 45–46.
41. Id. at 20.
42. Id. at 13.
43. See id.
44. Cf. id. (expanding upon some state-specific regulatory problems).
45. See generally Due Diligence Explained, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/growth
/sectors/raw-materials/due-diligence-ready/explained_en (last visited Apr. 4, 2020); UN Sanc-
tions List: What You Need To Know, COMPLY ADVANTAGE, https://complyadvantage.com
/knowledgebase/what-are-sanctions/un-sanctions-list-united-nations-security-council-
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eign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) and the Know Your Customer 
(“KYC”) requirements in the United States for example, generally require 
companies to undertake as far as reasonably possible to determine the bene-
ficial owner of companies with whom they transact.
46
Still, it should be not-
ed that national authorities around the world could do more to require their 
corporate entities to look into the parties with whom they transact.
47
That, 
however, steps outside the narrow scope of beneficial ownership regulation.
The 2018 Transparency International report on the subject neatly sum-
marizes the modern consensus:
Governments should establish a central register of beneficial own-
ership information and make it publicly available in open data for-
mat.
Governments should resource and establish mechanisms to ensure 
that at least some verification of beneficial ownership information 
takes place, such as cross-checking the data against other govern-
ment and tax databases, or conducting random inspections.
Financial institutions or [other at-risk professional institutions] 
should not be allowed to proceed with transactions if the beneficial 
owner of their customer cannot be identified.
Governments should undertake national money laundering risk as-
sessments on a regular basis. These should include an analysis of 
the risks posed by domestic and foreign legal entities and arrange-
ments.
Key stakeholders, including obliged entities and civil society or-
ganisations should be consulted. The results of the assessment 
should be published online.
Governments should consider prohibiting nominee shareholders. If 
they are allowed, they should be required to disclose their status 
upon the registration of the company and registered as nominees. 
Nominees should be licensed and subject to strict anti-money laun-
dering obligations.
Governments should require the registration of both domestic and 
foreign trusts operating in their country. Information on all parties 
to the trust (trustee, settlor and beneficiaries), and the real individu-
als behind them should be recorded.”
48
consolidated-list/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2020); AMY S. MATSUO, OFAC FRAMEWORK FOR 
SANCTIONS COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (2019).
46. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977); Dan Ryan, FinCEN: 
Know Your Customer Requirements, HARV. L. SCHOOL F. ON CORP. GOV. (Feb. 7, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/07/fincen-know-your-customer-requirements/.
47. See generally VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS et al., supra note 10 (describing at 
considerable length the issues posed by transacting with counterparties around the world 
whose ownership is unknown).
48. MARTINI & MURPHY, supra note 37, at 15.
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There remains much work to be done to achieve this level of compliance 
and monitoring globally.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
Progress on the issue has been slow, but steady, in the last five years. 
Much of the action has come through international organizations. In 2015, 
the year after G20 leaders agreed to adopt FATF’s basic recommendations, 
Transparency International found that fifteen out of the twenty countries had 
weak or average frameworks for beneficial ownership.
49
Only one, the Unit-
ed Kingdom, had a publicly accessible registry of beneficial ownership in-
formation for all companies.
50
Three years later, eleven countries still had 
weak or average beneficial ownership frameworks, but six countries had 
implemented registries of beneficial ownership information.
51
The EU has made the most significant strides on this issue. 4AMLD 
mandated a central registry of beneficial ownership information for all EU 
countries and 5AMLD is poised to require further investigation of transac-
tions and bank transfers presenting even one of a handful of suspicious 
characteristics.
52
Indeed, in Transparency International’s 2018 report, four 
out of the six countries with central registries were EU nations that had re-
cently come into compliance with 4AMLD.
53
The United Kingdom was also 
one of the nations with a registry, but its central registry predated 4AMLD 
by a considerable amount of time.
54
The United States is trailing on this issue despite being a major influ-
encer and purveyor of international sanctions regimes. The U.S. currently 
lags behind FATF requirements, as companies incorporated within its juris-
dictions face a varying degree of regulatory burdens from their respective 
state-level authorities.
55
While the United States does require financial insti-
tutions to collect beneficial ownership information for individuals who open 
financial accounts on behalf of their legal entities, there is very little federal 
or state regulation requiring disclosure of beneficial ownership information 
at present.
56
A bill to fix this problem has passed the U.S. House of Repre-
49. Id. at 10; see also G20, supra note 29.
50. MARTINI & MURPHY, supra note 37, at 12.
51. Id. at 11–12.
52. Taylor, supra note 21; Directive (EU) 2018/843, of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 30 May 2018 Amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the Prevention of the Use 
of the Financial System for the Purposes of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing, and 
Amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU, para. 10, 2018 O.J. (L 156).
53. See MARTINI & MURPHY, supra note 37, at 12.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 13.
56. Id. See also G-20 ANTI-CORRUPTION WORKING GROUP, GUIDE TO BENEFICIAL 
OWNERSHIP INFORMATION: LEGAL ENTITIES AND LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS, STOLEN ASSET 
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sentatives and awaits debate in the Senate; if enacted, it would create a cen-
tral registry operated by the U.S. Department of Treasury and the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).
57
U.S. businesses would be re-
quired to confirm that there has been no change in beneficial ownership 
once a year to Treasury and FinCEN.
58
There is some reason to be hopeful that this problem can be extin-
guished altogether in the coming years. In October 2014, FATF found twen-
ty-four countries had strategic deficiencies in their beneficial ownership 
frameworks.
59
It further identified four of these nations as being slow to 
make progress and recommended active risk-management countermeasures 
against another two.
60
As of October 2020 (after a slight uptick in deficien-
cies that can be linked to the COVID-19 pandemic), eighteen countries re-
main on the list.
61
None are subject to increased monitoring, though FATF 
continues to recommend countermeasures against two nations.
62
Still, even just eighteen countries with lackluster beneficial ownership 
monitoring is a massive security risk. Mossack Fonseca, the law firm at the 
center of the Panama Papers scandal, single-handedly created more than 
200,000 legal entities in 200 countries.
63
Even assuming that Mossack Fon-
seca was one of the larger players in the practice of creating shell companies 
for shady characters to hide behind, eighteen countries with underperform-
ing standards could still mean tens of thousands of potential sanctions viola-
tions, terrorist financing plots, terrorist-repurposed pickup trucks, and des-
pot-absconded limousines likely amounting to billions of dollars in dirty 
money.
64
The U.N., for its part, has mostly ceded regulatory ground on this issue 
to other international organizations. The Conference of States Parties to the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption held a thorough review of 
RECOVERY INITIATIVE, 5 (Oct. 2016), https://star.worldbank.org/sites/star/files/g20_bo_
country_guide_united_states.pdf.
57. See CARL A. FORNARIS, MARINA OLMAN-PAL & ANTHONY HERNANDEZ, U.S.
HOUSE PASSES BILL THAT WOULD REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF BENEFICIAL OWNERS OF U.S.




59. Previous FATF Lists, KNOWYOURCOUNTRY, https://www.knowyourcountry.com
/copy-of-fatf-aml-deficiency-list (last visited Oct. 29, 2020).
60. Id.
61. FATF AML List, KNOWYOURCOUNTRY.https://www.knowyourcountry.com/fatf-
aml-deficiency-list (last visited Oct. 29, 2020).
62. Id.
63. See The Panama Papers: Exposing the Rogue Offshore Finance Industry, supra 
note 14.
64. Cf. id. (detailing the extent of Mossack Fonseca’s misdeeds and providing some 
basis for further estimation).
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beneficial ownership when it met in Vienna in 2018.
65
It looked into how 
the takeaways from UNODC and the World Bank’s Puppet Masters report 
had been implemented and outlined a few areas of interest to experts and 
regulators in light of the Panama Papers disclosures.
66
Aside from that com-
prehensive discussion, there has been little movement at the policy level at 
the U.N..
67
As a major implementer of international normative sanctions, it 
is time for that to change.
IV.  What a Comprehensive United Nations Campaign 
May Entail
As the sponsoring organization for many of the world’s most complex 
sanctions regimes, the U.N. has a vested interest in ensuring that the targets 
of its sanctions have as few financial safe havens around the world as possi-
ble.
68
It is also uniquely positioned to push universal compliance with FATF 
guidelines across the finish line. It has several avenues available to it to 
drive regulatory reform on this subject.
A.  Exercising the Full Potential of UNODC
First, the U.N. should exercise some of the actual and symbolic 
measures available to it through UNODC to move the needle on this issue. 
Specifically, the U.N. should make use of UNODC’s model legislation and 
law enforcement training programs to further the modern consensus on ben-
eficial ownership.
69
UNODC should also explicitly reaffirm its support for 
FATF’s 40+9 recommendations.
UNODC’s last package of AML model legislation came out in 2009.
70
Its proffered measures on combatting terrorism are even older, dating back 
to 2005.
71
While beneficial ownership regulation is present as a concept in 
both packages, it is treated more as an afterthought in both documents; nei-
65. See U.N. Secretariat, Follow-up to the St. Petersburg Statement: Report of the In-
ternational Expert Group Meeting on Beneficial Ownership Transparency, U.N. Doc. CAC
/COSP/IRG/2018/7 (Apr. 5, 2018).
66. Id. ¶ ¶ 38, 71-85.
67. Cf. S.C. Res. 1617 (July 29, 2005); G.A. Res. 60/288 (Aug. 9, 2006) (representing 
the only official resolutions passed by any United Nations body on the topic).
68. See generally Sanctions, U.N. SEC. COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil
/sanctions/information (last visited June 8, 2020).
69. Model Laws and Treaties, U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, https://www.unodc.org
/unodc/en/legal-tools/model-treaties-and-laws.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).
70. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT & INT’L
MONETARY FUND, MODEL PROVISIONS ON MONEY LAUNDERING, TERRORIST FINANCING,
PREVENTIVE MEASURES AND PROCEEDS OF CRIME (FOR COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS)
(2009).
71. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME & INT’L MONETARY FUND, MODEL LEGISLATION 
ON MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCING OF TERRORISM (2005).
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ther document directly addresses the role of beneficial ownership regulation 
in combatting money laundering or counter-terrorism efforts.
72
The consen-
sus on regulating this feature of legal personality afforded to corporate 
structures has shifted significantly in the last decade, and UNODC ought to 
revisit its model legislation package to account for this fact. A new, special-
ized packaged dealing specifically with beneficial ownership legislation 
may be warranted.
73
Given its active role in the model legislation space, 
UNODC is uniquely poised to draft language to accommodate the varying 
levels (state or federal) at which corporate entity registration takes place. 
UNODC ought to make use of this drafting capability to further the discus-
sion on what model statutes can look like for countries that are currently 
lagging behind.
UNODC’s law enforcement training activities also pose an incredible 
opportunity in this field. Not only should UNODC take an active role in 
training investigators to spot indicators of suspicious financial activity (as it 
already does
74
), but it should also train regulators to look for suspicious fil-
ing characteristics at the time of entity registration. There are several red 
flags that can be observed from filing information alone, including: incorpo-
ration and conduct of business in one of the few remaining jurisdictions 
with no beneficial ownership disclosure requirements, existence of nominee 
directors or shareholders in jurisdictions that still permit them, spotty online 
presence and contact information, and indications of primary place of busi-
ness in a jurisdiction other than the one where registration is filed.
75
UNODC ought to be working with regulators around the world, particularly 
in the remaining high risk jurisdictions, to implement monitoring programs 
that flag suspicious filings as they occur, rather than perpetually playing 
catch-up by waiting for those entities to engage in suspicious behavior be-
fore investigating them properly.
Lastly, UNODC should explicitly reaffirm its support for FATF’s rec-
ommendations. The U.N. as a whole has generally thrown its weight behind 
the FATF recommendations; U.N.S.C. Resolution 1617 and U.N. General 
Assembly resolution 60/288 jointly stress the importance of FATF 40+9
implementation.
76
No body of the U.N. has reaffirmed its support of FATF’s
recommendations since 2006, although the recommendations have been re-
viewed and revised numerous times since then.
77
The FATF provisions re-
72. Id.; U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME et al., supra note 70.
73. See IDB-OECD Toolkit, supra note 6, at 6.
74. See, e.g., Cops to Receive Training on Trade-Based Money Laundering, LOOP 
NEWS (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.looptt.com/content/cops-receive-training-trade-based-
money-laundering.
75. Emily Primeaux, Hiding in Plain Sight: How Criminals Use Anonymous Shell 
Companies, FRAUD CONF. NEWS (June 17, 2018), https://www.fraudconferencenews.com
/home/2018/6/17/breaking-the-shell.
76. See S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 67, ¶ 7; G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 67, ¶ 10..
77. FATF, The FATF Recommendations, supra note 20 (last updated in October 2020).
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lating to beneficial ownership were reviewed in 2014.
78
Reiterating the im-
portance of the FATF principles may do some good in pushing laggard 
member states towards compliance.
B. Presenting a United Front through UNCITRAL
It is important that the U.N. show consistency throughout the organiza-
tion in the seriousness with which it treats this issue. UNCITRAL’s mission 
is primarily to comment on issues of international trade law.
79
The U.N. is 
not the primary regulator of international trade law as it relates to transac-
tions between states; it has ceded that regulatory territory to the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”).
80
Instead, UNCITRAL is the leading body 
overseeing the rules for international dispute resolution.
81
International 
transactional contracts that feature alternative dispute resolution methods 
frequently specify UNCITRAL’s rules of arbitration as the governing law.
82
As a part of its governance of these rules, UNCITRAL maintains a se-
ries of documents about related topics of law for use by parties entering into 
international transactions as well as regulators looking to smooth interna-
tional trade issues.
83
One of these documents is the UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide on Key Principles of a Business Registry. 
84
The current edition was 
published in 2019.
85
The document is 138-pages long. Beneficial ownership 
is referenced in two paragraphs.
86
Even in those two paragraphs, the issue is 
treated as more of a jurisdictional legal quirk rather than a serious AML pol-
icy issue.
87
First and foremost, UNCITRAL should revisit this document as soon as 
possible. While the document is clearly intended to complement the docu-
ments most central to UNCITRAL’s mission, it does the U.N. a disservice 
for UNCITRAL’s formulation of national business registries to neglect ade-
quately addressing a central tenet thereof. Given that the U.N. already ought 
78. See FATF, Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership, supra note 20.
79. About UNCITRAL, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/en
/about (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).
80. Frequently Asked Questions – Mandate and History, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L 
TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/en/about/faq/mandate_composition/history (last visited Sept. 
22, 2020).
81. See id.
82. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L.,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/contractualtexts/arbitration (last visited Sept. 22, 
2020).
83. Texts and Status, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts
/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2020).
84. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON KEY 
PRINCIPLES OF A BUSINESS REGISTRY (2019).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 52, 77.
87. See id.
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to be more actively invested in this issue, it is particularly counterproductive 
for its own ancillary documents to gloss over the subject.
Additionally, it may be worth composing another document through the 
same division that authored the document on business registries, the Work-
ing Group on Micro, Small, and Medium-sized Enterprises, solely focused 
on beneficial ownership.
88
If full FATF 40+9 compliance is achieved 
worldwide, the regulatory burden on small business certainly will not be 
negligible.
89
Helping such businesses adjust to a global regulatory environ-
ment is a worthy goal for UNCITRAL, particularly when no other regulator 
has yet stepped in to fill this void. Country level compliance in principle 
will be of little use if private actors find the policy extraordinarily difficult 
to comply with.
90
C.  Deploying U.N.S.C. Legislative Powers
In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the U.N.S.C. exer-
cised legislative powers that were more expansive than any means the Secu-
rity Council had utilized before.
91
Likely because of the sheer shock and 
magnitude of the events, nobody seriously questioned the exercise of such 
power as it related to Resolution 1373 in the immediate aftermath of the at-
tacks.
92
In the months and years that followed, the U.N.S.C. was receptive to 
the quiet criticism that its course of action was rather unrepresentative; 
though binding on all member states, only U.N.S.C. members at the time of 
the attacks had any insight to the development and passage of Resolution 
1373.
93
The U.N.S.C. exercised its Chapter VII authorities in a legislative 
fashion again in 2004 in Resolution 1540.
94
Resolution 1540 concerned it-
self both with counterterrorism and nuclear and chemical non-proliferation 
measures.
95
Sensitive to the lingering concerns about the power exercised in 
resolution 1373, U.N.S.C. made sure to hold many, open deliberation ses-
88. See generally id. (the UNCITRAL legislative guide calls the business registries the 
Working Group on Micro, Small, and Medium-sized Enterprises)
89. Cf. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS et. al, supra note 10, at 8 (“. . . a service provider 
can undertake only so much due diligence”).
90. Id.
91. See S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 6 (Sept. 28, 2001) (creating the first ever Counterterrorism 
Committee).
92. Id.
93. IAN JOHNSTONE, THE POWER OF DELIBERATION 96–98 (2011) (Some scholars dis-
agree with Professor Johnstone’s formulation of deliberative legitimacy, but the United Na-
tions has shown little signs of vastly expanding the use of its Chapter VII legislative powers, 
suggesting that future legislation would follow his conception of the process as delivering le-
gitimacy in its own right). Compare Jose E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited,
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 873, 875, 887 (2003) with Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World 
Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 175, 187 (2005).
94. See S.C. Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004); See generally U.N. Charter arts. 48–51.
95. S.C. Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004)
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sions with member states outside of its own membership to ensure broad in-
ternational support and acceptability of 1540’s provisions.
96
The legitimacy granted by this deliberate, open process—what Profes-
sor Ian Johnstone of Tufts University calls “deliberative legitimacy”—
seems to indirectly reinforce U.N.S.C.’s ability to legislate, so long as it 
seeks the input of non-member states in doing so.
97
Given beneficial owner-
ship policies’ far-reaching impact, particularly in the realm of terrorism fi-
nancing and smuggling operations, and the general international consensus 
on how to address the issue, it may be a prime candidate for the next de-
ployment of U.N.S.C.’s legislative powers.
Legislating on this subject would likely be narrow and conform closely 
to principles for which there is broad-based support. A narrow resolution 
mandating FATF 40+9 compliance by a fixed date a few years from now 
might be a fair start.
98
The U.N.S.C. could, of course, go further than this. The U.N.S.C. could 
play a big role, if it so chooses, in advancing the consensus view on benefi-
cial ownership to include and require publicly accessible registries. No one 
has yet suggested a truly global beneficial ownership database of all entities 
registered in all U.N. member states; just as member states currently feed 
intelligence about suspected terror affiliates to the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, so too they could provide information about suspect corporate 
entities—or even all legal entities registered in their jurisdiction—to their 
colleagues around the world.  Though this idea may face significantly more 
pushback on sovereignty grounds, that may be the next step in this fight.
99
It is certainly not lost on the Security Council that corporate entities can 
play a big part in the financing of terrorist groups; there are currently 
eighty-nine entities listed with known connections to ISIS, Al-Qaida, or 
both.
100
The most natural pushback to this course of action would be to question 
whether beneficial ownership policy is really on the same playing field as 
other, more traditional counterterrorism and non-proliferation initiatives. 
This is a fair question. Given the powerful ability of beneficial ownership 
regulation to take down terrorism financing (and other criminal enterprises), 
there is a rather strong argument to be made that this sort of legislative reso-
96. See JOHNSTONE, supra note 93, at 99–101.
97. See id. at 97–99.
98. Importantly, such a resolution would not require conforming to any other OECD 
directives, or even any other FATF guidelines. The U.N.S.C. would be perfectly within its 
rights to mandate compliance with the FATF’s recommendations on beneficial ownership 
without endorsing, writ large, the FATF’s positions on any other topic.
99. ISIL (Da’esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List, UNITED NATIONS SEC. COUNCIL, 
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list (last visited Oct. 8, 
2020).
100. See S.C. Res. 1267 ¶ 4(b) (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1730 (Dec. 19, 2006); S.C. 
Res. 1904 (Dec. 17, 2009).
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lution is a pure, natural extension of U.N.S.C precedent set in resolutions 
1373 and 1540; if counterterrorism measures are fair game for U.N.S.C’s
legislative powers, and these measures meaningfully tackle terrorism around 
the world, then mandating FATF compliance is perhaps a natural derivative 
of the original, accepted use of U.N.S.C’s legislative powers.
Another opposition to such a use of U.N.S.C legislative powers could 
be an institutional concern. Until now, U.N.S.C legislative powers have 
been deployed directly against threats to international peace and security: 
nuclear and chemical weapon use, targeting non-state actors, restricting 
travel and freezing assets of known combatants, etc.
101
It might be fair to say 
that implementing FATF compliance through U.N.S.C’s legislative powers
would be the first indirect use of these powers. Insufficient beneficial own-
ership records are not themselves a threat to peace and security; it is bad ac-
tors’ exploitation of such policy that makes them dangerous. Moving to ad-
dress indirect threats to international peace and security, conservative 
institutionalists might say, is a step too far, lest we wantonly create a super-
legislature of nearly unlimited power.
102
This is perhaps the most valid con-
cern and criticism of this use of U.N.S.C’s legislative powers.
Professor Stefan Talmon, a noted scholar of public international law, 
wrote the following while discussing the limitations on the Security Coun-
cil’s Chapter VII authority in 2005:
“. . .the Council cannot regulate financial transactions in general 
but only transactions that may be linked to a threat to the peace; 
that is, to terrorist acts, the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction, and possibly transnational organized crime, the illegal 
arms trade, and drug trafficking.”
103
I share Professor Talmon’s view on this matter. I do not believe that the 
regulation of day-to-day financial transactions is the unfettered domain of 
the U.N.S.C. I do, however, offer the following supplementary axiom to 
Professor Talmon’s formulation: Any policy proposal with the clear, intend-
ed effect of taming a widely recognized threat to international peace and se-
curity is properly within the realm of U.N.S.C.’s legislative powers. Chapter 
VII grants U.N.S.C the power to define for itself matters pertaining to inter-
national peace and security.
104
Where the U.N.S.C properly generates Pro-
fessor Johnstone’s “deliberative legitimacy” for its proposed course of ac-
tion by ensuring broad-based, international support, its actions are 
legitimate.
105
101. See supra notes 91, 95, and 100.
102. See Talmon, supra note 93, at 182–86.
103. Id. at 183.
104. U.N. Charter art. 39.
105. See JOHNSTONE, supra note 93, at 97–99.
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This principle is clearly satisfied in the case of mandatory beneficial 
ownership reform. FATF recommendations enjoy broad international sup-
port; there are in fact just eighteen countries out of the nearly 200 in the in-
ternational community that are currently lagging behind appropriate compli-
ance.
106
The Security Council itself previously urged FATF compliance in 
2005. Additionally, the permanent members—the biggest hurdle to any Se-
curity Council proposal—are all reasonably supportive of the FATF guide-
lines.
107
If not for the concern of Security Council overreach, a resolution 
mandating FATF compliance in by some fixed date a few years in the future 
ought not to face a lot of resistance.
It should be noted, however, that the ongoing worry of institutional 
overreach at the U.N. is no trifling matter. Practically no discussion at the 
U.N.S.C. concludes without at least some discussion of the national sover-
eignty effects of the proposals at hand.
108
This concern, at a broad level, is 
well-founded; at any given time, only fifteen nations hold voting power at 
the Security Council.
109
While most resolutions are less expansive and far-
reaching than Resolutions 1373 and 1540, the “deliberative legitimacy” pro-
cess instituted for the latter is usually absent as well.
110
This pseudo-random 
group of fifteen nations has binding authority, therefore, over the entire 193-
nation community.
111
There is no guarantee that the tolerance for minor in-
cursions on national sovereignty of those fifteen countries is in any way rep-
resentative of the whole membership. While this concern is perhaps over-
wrought, it should not be dismissed outright.
112
The U.N. itself is sensitive 
to this criticism, and from a realist perspective, the looming, omnipresent 
nature of this concern is likely to doom the use of U.N.S.C. legislative pow-
ers for beneficial ownership reform.
113
Beneficial ownership regulation 
106. See supra note 61.
107. Cf. supra note 55 and FATF Members and Observers, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE 
(FATF), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/membersandobservers (last visited June 8, 2020) (All 
P5 members are members of FATF and in compliance with its minimum requirements, indi-
cating at least a bare minimum understanding and support of the policy regime’s benefits).
108. See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Speakers in Security Council urge Bal-
ance between UN Role in State Sovereignty, Human Rights Protection, But Differ over Inter-
pretation of Charter Principles, U.N. Press Release SC/12241 (Feb. 15, 2016).
109. U.N. Charter art. 23.
110. See JOHNSTONE, supra note 93, at 97–99.
111. U.N. Charter art. 25.
112. See generally Rose Worden, The Importance of Sovereignty and Security at the 
UN, IMPAKTER (Apr. 21, 2017), https://impakter.com/importance-sovereignty-security-un/
(addressing some of the nuances of sovereignty as a rhetorical device and going concern at the 
U.N.).
113. Cf. Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST (Sept. 16, 1999), 
https://www.economist.com/international/1999/09/16/two-concepts-of-sovereignty (Secre-
tary-General Kofi Annan discussing sovereignty in detail from an institutional perspective a 
little over a year and a half into his first term, noting the importance of balancing enforcement 
and deterrent powers at the institutional level).
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simply is not the kind of thing the U.N.S.C. engages in as a standalone is-
sue. It is not maintenance of international peace and security in the classical 
sense; it is not the kind of high stakes standoff the in which the Council is 
well-versed in dealing, nor is it the kind of direct intervention in armed hos-
tilities it finds itself coordinating once every twenty-five years.
114
It is hard 
to imagine the Security Council—no matter the legal rationale for or effica-
cy of the resolution in question—sticking its neck out for something like 
this. It is also unlikely that the Security Council could implement such a 
system for its own sanctions without a formal resolution. While the resolu-
tions establishing the terrorism financing committee do delegate to it the au-
thority to coordinate with member states and promulgate processes reasona-
bly designed to effectuate the sanctions, the committee probably could not 
implement legally binding rules pertaining to all entities within member 
states.
115
Such an effort would likely fall outside the terrorism financing 
committee’s powers and, without formal authorization in the form of a reso-
lution, may constitute the sort of overly broad regulation that Professor 
Talmon contemplated as outside of the Council’s narrow purview over fi-
nancial transactions.
Mandating a public, international registry of all entities registered in all 
member states along with their beneficial owners is also unlikely to have the 
broad international support necessary to secure its passage through the Se-
curity Council. For one, there will undoubtedly be several nations uncom-
fortable with the national sovereignty implications of being forced to turn 
over that list.
116
Even if they are required to collect that information, they 
might say it is none of the U.N.’s business who is doing business in their 
respective countries so long as each government is prepared to guarantee its 
legitimacy.
Several nations may also be uncomfortable about what such a registry
would reveal about their own business dealings. There is reason to believe 
that many governments operate complicated webs of international shell 
companies for a variety reasons (protecting state secrets, technology trans-
fers, intelligence gathering efforts, etc).
117
It is unlikely that those same 
114. See generally United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Depart-
ment of Field Support, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines
(Jan. 2010), https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/capstone_eng_0.pdf; Ronald Hatto, 
From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: The Evolution of the Role of the United Nations in 
Peace Operations, 95 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 495 (2013).
115. See Talmon, supra note 93, at 183, 188.
116. See Press Release, Security Council, Speakers in Security Council Urge Balance 
between UN Role in State Sovereignty, Human Rights Protection, But Differ over Interpreta-
tion of Charter Principles, U.N. Press Release SC/12241 (Feb. 15, 2016), for a recent example 
of the sovereignty issue arising in the Security Council.
117. See The CEO Who Loved Me, ECONOMIST (Feb. 22, 2020), 
https://www.economist.com/business/2020/02/22/spies-often-use-businesses-as-cover; Jodi 
Vittori, How Anonymous Shell Companies Finance Insurgents, Criminals, and Dictators, 
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powers would vote for the public release of all corporate beneficial owner-
ship data when doing so would make it very difficult for their own entities 
to go about their business.
V.  What if Beneficial Ownership is Best Left to 
Other Organizations?
The most formidable counterargument to U.N. involvement in this area 
is likely not any serious argument that beneficial ownership policy is not
exploited by bad actors, but rather that the U.N. is not the appropriate vehi-
cle through which to do something about it. If the U.N.S.C ought not to im-
pose its legislative powers on this issue (for reasons outlined above), and the 
U.N.’s endorsement of FATF principles in 2005 and 2006 is theoretically 
sufficient to carryover to its current iteration, then perhaps there is nothing 
left to do.
118
The answer to this line of thinking is an immensely practical one; the 
U.N., as the premier international organization for the cooperation of states 
on matters of peace, security, and policy, is uniquely positioned to address 
most policy harmonization efforts around the world. This issue is no differ-
ent. While FATF, the EU, the World Bank, and others have played their part 
in developing the policy response to this problem, and quite admirably so,
the U.N. is still the organization best suited to make the final push toward 
universal compliance at the international level. At the organizational level, it 
is uniquely situated to influence and incentivize laggard states to catch up 
on this issue.
There is much work to be done in advancing the policy consensus, as 
well. The FATF’s principles are quite effective at curbing a significant 
amount of money laundering and terrorism financing activity. At the very 
least, FATF implementation make such schemes much easier for authorities 
to detect, shut down, and prosecute.
119
FATF’s 40+9 recommendations, 
however, do have areas for improvement. For one thing, FATF compliance 
does not require beneficial ownership information to be made public.
120
While it does make it easier for sophisticated companies to learn who their 
counterparties in business transactions really are, it might still be difficult 
for small business to acquire that information without a fully-searchable, 
public database. Outside of the EU, where it was required under 4AMLD, 
only a handful of countries have implemented such a database.
121
Council on Foreign Rels. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/report/how-anonymous-shell-
companies-finance-insurgents-criminals-and-dictators.
118. S.C. Res. 1617 (July 29, 2005); G.A. Res. 60/288, (Aug. 9, 2006).
119. See WILLEBOIS et. al., supra note 10, at 102–107.
120. See FATF, The FATF Recommendations, supra note 20, at 91–97 (noting, however, 
that the procedures for collecting and holding beneficial ownership information should be 
made public).
121. See MARTINI & MURPHY, supra note 37, at 12.
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VI.  Conclusion
In July of 2019, the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) 
published a comprehensive, investigative report into North Korea’s supply 
chain for luxury vehicles outlawed by U.N.S.C resolution 1718.
122
C4ADS 
found eighty-two previously unreported shipments of 803 luxury vehicles, 
including the two armored Mercedes limousines Kim Jong-Un was later pic-
tured in, between 2015 and 2017 alone.
123
At least twenty-four corporate en-
tities, mostly based in China and Russia, participated in the process of cov-
ertly moving the cars to North Korea as guarantors, consignors, or 
consignees.
124
Hugh Griffiths, Senior Researcher and Head of Countering 
Illicit Trafficking-Mechanism Assessment Program at the Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute and coordinator for the U.N. panel con-
vened to monitor North Korean sanctions compliance, summed up the sig-
nificance of the problem succinctly:
“If you can smuggle luxury limos into North Korea, which is done 
by shipping container, that means you can smuggle in smaller com-
ponents– dual-use items for ballistic and nuclear programs.”
125
Deficient beneficial ownership protections around the world are not just the 
esoteric consequence of complicated legal systems; they present a signifi-
cant threat to international peace and security as a vehicle for terrorism fi-
nancing, sanctions evasion, and other forms of criminal activity.
The insidiousness of loose beneficial ownership laws around the world 
is not in the cover afforded to any one company—it is the networks of com-
panies set up specifically to obfuscate their true ownership, intent, and oper-
ation that represent the paradigmatic threat. That phenomenon is present in 
full force in the North Korean example;
126
it is on full display in the Panama 
Papers scandal;
127
it is likely a part of the explanation of how an American 
plumber’s pickup truck ends up in Syria with heavy machine guns mounted 
on the back, pointed at American-backed forces.
The progress thus far on this issue—driven mostly by international or-
ganizations with voluntary participation—has been noteworthy. UNODC 
and the World Bank jointly brought beneficial ownership exploitation to the 
forefront of the international consciousness nearly a decade ago.
128
The 
FATF has established a workable baseline for country-level regulation.
129
122. See generally KUO & ARTERBRUN, supra note 2 .
123. Id. at 23, 33.
124. Id. at 25–29.
125. Id. at 7.
126. See generally id.
127. See generally The Panama Papers: Exposing the Rogue Offshore Finance Industry,
supra note 14.
128. See WILLEBOIS et al., supra note 10.
129. See FATF, The FATF Recommendations, supra note 20.
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The EU has been the driving force behind pushing a centralized registry sys-
tem—the first such effort at a regional level—through 4AMLD and 
5AMLD implementation.
130
Now is the time for the U.N. to take a stand on 
this issue in a binding fashion.
Deficient beneficial ownership laws are a threat to the maintenance of 
all of the U.N. sanctions regimes. It is therefore appropriate for the U.N. to 
step into this arena. It is, in my view, a reasonable extension of U.N.S.C.’s
legislative powers from a legal perspective—thus far applied narrowly to 
counterterrorism efforts—to combat the exploitation of this facet of corpo-
ration law around the world. The U.N. has a pivotal and widely accepted 
role to play in maintaining international peace and security. All member 
states agree to that mandate as laid out in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
131
This policy matter’s direct link to the maintenance thereof makes it a prime 
candidate for the further deployment of the U.N.S.C. legislative powers, 
provided the appropriate level of “deliberative legitimacy” of Professor 
Johnstone’s estimation can be achieved.
132
The U.N.’s reticence and/or ina-
bility to act in such a matter is understandable, given the nature of the insti-
tution’s concern for appearing to encroach too far on national sovereignty 
and, of course, the veto powers in the U.N.S.C.
The policy consensus that I have taken for granted also has room for 
improvement. The U.N. should be a part of pushing the envelope on that 
front as well. Nothing in this legal rationale for U.N.S.C. action is to say 
that the U.N. should not continue its analytical and academic support of the 
policy discourse on this matter. UNODC and UNCITRAL are well-
positioned to continue their work in this manner. There may be other bodies 
within the U.N. structure that also have methods and tools at their disposal 
that may be of use in the pursuit of full FATF compliance and tightening of 
beneficial ownership regulation worldwide.
The work in this field is ongoing. Policy advancements in this area have 
a direct effect on peace and security in the international community. Their 
benefits are tangible. In the past decade, policymakers have awoken to the 
threat posed by weak regulations of this variety and their own ability to 
make them stronger. I am hopeful that stricter regulation of beneficial own-
ership will render exploitation and sanctions evasion will be much more dif-
ficult in the next one.
130. See Taylor supra note 21.
131. U.N. Charter arts. 48–51.
132. JOHNSTONE, supra note 93, at 96–98.

